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DO SPIN-OFFS REALLY CREATE VALUE? THE EUROPEAN CASE
Abstract:
We study wealth effects for a sample of 161 spin-offs from 15 different European
countries that were announced between January 1987 and September 2000. The
cumulative average abnormal return over the three-day event window is 2.35%. The
mean abnormal return is 2.89% for companies that increase their industrial focus and
only 1.20% for non-focus increasing companies. These results are in line with previous
studies for the United States. The long-run returns in excess of the market return are
significantly negative for both parent and pro-forma combined firms. However, if we
control for the size and book-to-market effects by creating a matching portfolio, we find
mostly insignificant long-run excess returns both for focus-increasing and non-focus
increasing parents, subsidiaries and pro-forma combined firms. This result suggests that,
unlike U.S. spin-offs, European spin-offs are not associated with long-run
outperformance.3
1. Introduction
There is a broad consensus in both the academic and the popular literature that spin-offs
create value. This consensus is based on the fact that a number of U.S. studies have
shown that the announcement of a spin-off is associated with positive abnormal returns.
Moreover, spin-offs also seem to exhibit long-run excess returns over periods from 6
months to 3 years after the spin-off is completed. In the last decade the popularity of
spin-offs has also spread to Europe. This may have been caused by the positive wealth
effects that were found for U.S. spin-offs. The availability of a large sample of European
spin-offs allows us to test the hypotheses whether spin-offs really create value on both
the short and the long run.
A spin-off is a pro-rata distribution of the shares of a firm’s subsidiary to the shareholders
of the company.  No cash transaction takes place. After the spin-off, the shareholders of
the parent company hold shares in both the parent company and the subsidiary
3. The
wealth effects that are associated with spin-off announcements are investigated in a
number of American studies. The main picture that emerges from these studies is clear.
Announcements of spin-offs by American firms are associated with strongly significant
abnormal returns that range from 1.32% to 5.56%
4. Spin-offs of companies that increase
their industrial focus by divesting a division in a different branch than the parent
company, are associated with higher abnormal returns than spin-offs of companies that
do not increase their industrial focus (see e.g. Daley et al. (1997), and Desai and Jain
(1999)). Empirical studies also find that non-taxable spin-offs are associated with higher
positive abnormal returns than taxable spin-offs (Copeland et al. (1987), and
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999)). In addition, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam
(1999) also find that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry exhibit higher
abnormal returns in the announcement period. These results show that the market
efficiently responds to the spin-off announcements by incorporating expected future
benefits into the current stock price.
                                                          
3 Other types of divestitures include split-ups and carve-outs. In a split-up the shares of all the subsidiaries
that comprise the firm are distributed. In this form of divestiture the parent ceases to exist. In an equity
carve-out, (some) of the shares of the subsidiary are sold to the public. This paper is restricted to spin-offs.4
A number of U.S. studies also find long-run outperformance of spun-off firms and their
parents. Cusatis et al. (1993), Desai and Jain (1999), and McConnell et al. (2001) find
that parents and subsidiaries involved in a spin-off, outperform matching firms.
According to press reports, this result is even used by portfolio managers to use a strategy
of buying spun-off entities once they begin trading as independent stocks
5. McConnell et
al. (2001) notice that the long-run outperformance of spin-offs can mainly be attributed to
a few outliers that perform extremely well. Desai and Jain (1999) conclude that the
outperformance of spin-offs can entirely be attributed to focus-increasing spin-offs.
Contrary to the results for the announcement period, the finding for the long-run excess
returns is remarkable. According to the market efficiency hypothesis, the positive effects
of the spin-off should be incorporated in the announcement date returns. An interesting
question is then whether spin-offs really create value on the long run or whether the U.S.
results were a consequence of chance. The latter explanation was recently put forward by
Fama (1998). He argues that studies finding significant long-run returns receive more
attention in the academic and the popular literature because they are more interesting. For
this reason it is useful to study spin-offs outside the United States. This gives us some
out-of-sample results on the long-run performance of companies involved in spin-offs.
In this paper we study European spin-offs
6. Spin-offs have only become popular in
Europe during the second half of the 1990s. In the period from 1987 to 1994 only 62
spin-offs took place. From 1995 the volume of spin-offs rapidly increased. The period
from January 1995 to September 2000 witnessed no less than 170 European spin-offs. A
possible reason for the late popularity in spin-offs lies in the fact that it took a relatively
long time before individual countries set up regulatory frameworks for spin-offs. Besides
that, in some countries, spin-offs are associated with potential fiscal problems.
Different results between the United States and Europe can a priori be explained by
corporate governance differences. Moerland (1995) argues that managers in Anglo-Saxon
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 See e.g. Rosenfeld (1984), Copeland et al. (1987), Slovin et al. (1995), Johnson et al. (1996), Daley et al.
(1997), Desai and Jain (1999), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), and Mulherin and Boone (2000).
5 See McConnell et al. (2001).
6 Other empirical research on announcements of non-US spin-offs was carried out by Janssens de Vroom
and Van Frederikslust (2000), and Murray (2000). Janssens de Vroom and Van Frederikslust (2000) find
positive abnormal returns for their  “English Legal Origin sample”  of 176 observations (that mostly
includes the United States and the United Kingdom) and insignificant abnormal returns for their “Other5
countries are more likely to focus on the interests of shareholders and managers in
continental Europe are more likely to take the interests of all the firm’s stakeholders into
account. According to La Porta et al. (2000), their index of “anti-director rights”, that
stems from La Porta et al. (1998), is a suitable measure for corporate governance
differences between countries. This index, that ranges from zero (very low shareholder
protection) to seven (very high shareholder protection), shows interesting differences
between European countries. For example, the United Kingdom has a value of 5 for the
index, which is the same as the value for the United States. Ireland, Spain and Norway
also have large scores (all have a score of 4). On the other hand, some European countries
show very low values for the index. Noteworthy examples are Belgium (a score of 0),
Germany and Italy (both a score of 1) and Switzerland and the Netherlands (both a score
of 2).
The most important results from this study can be summarized as follows. In total 161
spin-offs that were announced by European companies over the period from January
1987 to September 2000 are analyzed. The cumulative average abnormal return is 2.35%
over the event window from day –1 to day +1. This result is in line with previous studies
for the United States. Announcements of spin-offs that do not increase industrial focus
are associated with a cumulative average abnormal return of 1.20%. Spin-offs that do
increase industrial focus are associated with a higher cumulative average abnormal return
of 2.89%. We also find some evidence that firms that spin off foreign divisions exhibit
higher abnormal returns than firms that spin off domestic divisions. The divestiture of
relatively large subsidiaries is also associated with larger abnormal returns. Contrary to
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) we do not find any relation between the level of
information asymmetry and the size of the abnormal return. Results are not different
between countries with different corporate governance systems. If we define the long-run
excess return as the difference between the company return and the market return we
mostly find significantly negative long-run excess returns for the parents and the pro-
forma combined firms, and non-significant results for the subsidiaries. However, it is
argued in the literature that long-run excess returns can better be calculated as the
                                                                                                                                                                            
Legal Origin sample” of 34 observations. Murray (2000) finds positive abnormal returns for UK
companies. Both studies only look at announcement date returns and not at long-run excess returns.6
difference between the company return and the return on a matching firm
7. If we use this
methodology we find that long-run excess returns are mostly insignificant. This is the
case for focus-increasing and non-focus increasing parents, subsidiaries and pro-forma
combined firms. These results apply to relatively large samples. Moreover, they are
found for both mean and median returns. This result is contrary to U.S. results on spin-
offs. However, it is in line with the efficient market hypothesis. We conclude that spin-
offs really create value on the short run, i.e. at the announcement date, but that they do
not create value on the long-run.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the factors
that can explain the wealth effects from spin-offs. The data description and the
methodology are included in Section 3. The empirical results are included in Section 4.
The paper is concluded in Section 5 with a summary and some conclusions.
2. Factors that can explain the wealth effects from spin-offs
2.1.   Improvement of industrial focus
The motive that is most frequently mentioned in the literature for conducting a spin-off is
the possibility for the firm to concentrate on its core business. Daley et al. (1997) and
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) examine whether the stock market gains
associated with spin-offs can be explained by an increase in industrial focus. Focus-
increasing spin-offs are defined as spin-offs in which the parent company has a different
two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code than the subsidiary. Both studies
find that focus-increasing spin-offs are associated with significantly higher abnormal
returns than non-focus increasing spin-offs. Desai and Jain (1999) study the effect of
industrial diversification in more detail. They use three different measures of focus: (1)
the Herfindahl index; (2) the number of segments reported by the firm; (3) a dummy
variable equal to one when the 2-digit SIC-code of the subsidiary is different from the 2-
digit code of the parent, and to zero otherwise. In line with the results of Daley et al.
(1997), and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) they find that the abnormal returns
                                                          
7 See e.g. Barber and Lyon (1997), and Fama (1998).7
for the focus-increasing spin-offs are larger than for the non-focus increasing spin-offs. In
addition, they study the long-run performance of spin-offs after the announcement date.
This leads to the interesting result that the superior performance of the focus-increasing
spin-offs persists in the post-spin-off period. The abnormal returns for the focus-
increasing companies are significant 11.12%, 20.77% and 33.36% over respective
holding periods of one, two or three years following the spin-offs. This contrasts to
insignificant abnormal returns of -0.96%, -7.66% and -14.34% in the same respective
periods for the non-focus increasing spin-offs. Desai and Jain (1999) find that the
classification of a spin-off into focus-increasing or non-focus increasing is robust as
about 90% of the classifications are insensitive to the definition of focus reported. We
test the hypothesis that spin-offs of firms that increase their industrial focus will be
associated with higher abnormal returns than spin-offs of firms that do not increase their
industrial focus.
2.2.   Geographical focus
Previous studies on U.S. spin-offs only look at the industrial focus of companies. Another
possibility is that a spin-off increases the geographical focus of a firm. This can be
accomplished by spinning off a foreign division. We hypothesize that an improvement of
the geographical focus is associated with positive abnormal returns for the same reasons
as an improvement in industrial focus.
2.3. Decrease of information asymmetry
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) argue that firms may engage in a spin-off
because there is information asymmetry between the management of the firm and the
external capital market. This information asymmetry may result in undervaluation of the
firm. After the spin-off information asymmetry, and hence undervaluation, are likely to
decrease. For this reason, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) hypothesize that the
wealth effects of a spin-off are positively related to the level of information asymmetry of
the firm. They find that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry exhibit higher8
abnormal returns adjusted for the probability of a spin-off upon the announcements of
spin-offs. They also find that none of their information asymmetry variables is
significantly correlated with either of the two measures of negative synergies
8. The
information asymmetry variables therefore do not seem to be proxying for industrial
focus.
Habib et al. (1997) also present an information-based explanation for spin-offs. They
derive a model in which a firm can increase its value by spinning off a subsidiary. The
spin-off will lead to an increase of the number of securities that is traded on the market.
This makes the price system more informative and, hence, leads to a decrease of
information asymmetry. This decrease of information asymmetry will lead to an increase
of the total value of the firm and its spun off subsidiaries.
The Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) paper suggests the testable hypothesis that
spin-offs of firms with large information asymmetries will be associated with higher
abnormal returns than spin-offs of firms with low information asymmetries. The Habib et
al. (1997) paper leads to the hypothesis that firms, which show a decrease in information
asymmetry after the spin-off, are associated with positive long-run excess returns.
2.4. Corporate governance
It is often argued that managers in Anglo-Saxon countries are more focussed on
shareholder value creation and that managers in continental European countries are more
likely to take the interests of all the firm’s stakeholders into account (see e.g. Moerland,
1995). La Porta et al. (1998) have created an index for “antidirector rights”. This index is
a summary measure of shareholder protection. It ranges from zero to seven. A high value
of the index means that shareholders are better protected against the adverse behavior of
managers. Not surprisingly, the value of the index is lower for countries in continental
Europe than for Anglo-Saxon countries. In order to test whether managers perform spin-
offs for their own purposes or whether they perform them in order to benefit
shareholders, we also analyze whether spin-offs in countries with lower shareholder
                                                          
8 The measures of negative synergies are (1) a dummy variable for the difference in the 2-digit SIC codes
and (2) the unrelated entropy, this is the weighted average of the percentage sales of the various distinct
two-digit SIC industry groups within that firm.9




In the U.S. some spin-offs are taxable
10. Empirical research by Copeland et al. (1987),
and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) shows that taxable spin-offs are associated
with lower positive abnormal returns than non-taxable spin-offs. Spin-offs in European
countries generally do not create tax problems, because it is possible to defer tax
payments (see the appendix for details). Exceptions apply to Germany, France and the
Netherlands (before 1998). In Germany spin-offs can be arranged in a tax-neutral way.
However, if more than 20% of the shareholders transfer their shares within 5 years after
the spin-off, the spin-off will still be taxed (Zaman, 1998). In France the problem is that it
is not possible for the company to ask for approval from the tax authorities before the
transaction is carried out. However, for both Germany and France it is not known at the
announcement date whether the spin-off will be taxed. The decision on the taxation in
France will only be taken after the spin-off date. In Germany it will depend on the
transfer of shares in the period after the spin-off. For this reason we do not include a
variable on taxation in our analysis.
Schipper and Smith (1983), and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) have studied
whether regulatory motives play a role for American companies to engage in a spin-off.
Both studies show that the abnormal returns are not affected by the regulatory status of
the spin-off. In the appendix we discuss the regulatory consequences of European spin-
offs. From this appendix it can be concluded that regulation does not cause an obstacle
for spin-offs to be carried out in European countries. An analysis of the literature on the
regulation of spin-offs in Europe also has not led to a motive that makes spin-offs
particularly attractive for regulatory purposes.
                                                          
9 The index has the following values for the countries in our study: United Kingdom (5), Germany (1),
France (3), Italy (1), Sweden (3), Norway (4), Denmark (2), Finland (3), the Netherlands (2), Belgium (0),
Switzerland (2), Spain (4), Austria (2), Ireland (4) and Greece (2).
10 See Schipper and Smith (1983), Copeland et al. (1987, page 136), and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam
(1999) for a discussion on the tax consequences of U.S. spin-offs.10
Another potential explanation for the positive stock market reaction to spin-off
announcements is the possibility to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders.
The bondholder wealth expropriation hypothesis states that during a spin-off the assets
and liabilities are structured in a manner that involves a transfer of wealth from the
bondholders to the shareholders of the firm. However, such an effect is difficult to
measure in an event study. The reason for this is that at the moment that the spin-off is
announced it is generally not known whether such a wealth transfer will actually occur.
Besides that, the consensus in the U.S. literature is that there is little evidence of wealth
transfers between bond- and shareholders in American spin-offs
11.
A number of studies find that the wealth effects are larger when the portion of assets that
is divested is larger (see e.g. Hite and Owers (1983), Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), and
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999)). In our study we control for this by using the
market value of equity of the divested subsidiary relative to the sum of the equity
capitalizations of the parent and the subsidiary. This is computed on the day of the
completion of the spin-off.
3.  Data description and methodology
3.1. Data description
We analyze a sample of European spin-offs. A European spin-off is defined as a spin-off
in which a European parent spins off a subsidiary. This subsidiary can be either from the
same or from a different country. All European countries are taken into account with the
exception of the Eastern European, formerly Socialist, countries.
The sample covers the period from January 1987 to September 2000. The announcement
dates are obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions
Database. Data on stock prices, market values of equity and market indices are derived
                                                          
11 Hite and Owers (1983), Schipper and Smith (1983), and Dittmar (2000) find that the announcement
period bond returns are not significantly different from zero. Schipper and Smith (1983) and Dittmar
(2000) find that only a small number of companies decline in bond ratings after the spin-off. The only study
that finds a wealth transfer is Parrino (1997). In a case study of the Marriott spin-off he shows that the
restructuring not only reduced the collateral on Marriott’s existing debt, but also reduced the bondholder
claims on cash flows from the business. However, his study is only based on one company.11
from Datastream. Primary SIC codes are from the Compustat (where available) and SDC
databases. The original sample consisted of 232 European spin-offs. Table 1 reports the
annual distribution of the announcements to spin-off a part of the company.
[Please insert Table 1 here]
The row with the total number of observations shows that with 44% the United Kingdom
is heavily represented in the total sample (102 out of 232 observations). Other countries
that are relatively well represented include Sweden with 30 observations (13%), Germany
with 19 observations (8%), Norway with 18 observations (8%) and Italy with 14
observations (6%). The other 10 countries take up 21% of the sample (49 observations).
The last column of Table 1 shows that the distribution in time is also disproportionate.
Most announcements (73%) were made in the period from January 1995 to September
2000. The period from 1987 up to and including 1994 only counted for 62 (27%)
observations.
A number of spin-offs had to be eliminated from the original sample. The first reason is
that sometimes a parent company announced spin-offs of two or more subsidiaries
simultaneously. We checked for these double records and eliminated 16 double counts.
We also eliminated announcements where one subsidiary was spun off by multiple
parents. The only case where this applied was with the English utility National Grid,
which led to the elimination of 7 announcements. The third reason is that for a large
number of companies no stock prices were available in Datastream. This led to the
elimination of 48 observations. The final sample consists of 161 observations. The final
sample still shows a large representation of the United Kingdom with 71 observations
(44%), Sweden with 24 observations (15%), Germany with 14 observations (9%) and
Italy with 12 observations (7%).
3.2. Proxies
The variables that are used in the analysis are related to the hypotheses described in
section 2.
Industrial focus. An improvement in industrial focus is measured using a dummy
variable. This variable is 1 if the two-digit SIC code of the subsidiary is different from12
the two-digit SIC code of the parent (spin-off of an unrelated division) and 0 if the two-
digit SIC codes are the same
12.
Geographical focus. Like industrial focus, an improvement in geographical focus
is measured using a dummy variable. This variable is 1 if a foreign division is spun off
and 0 if a domestic division is spun off.
Information asymmetry. We use three different measures for information
asymmetry. These variables are all derived from the Institute of Brokerage for Investment
Services (IBES). The first is the earnings forecast error measured before the
announcement of the spin-off, from now on to be referred to as the forecast error. We
define the average earnings forecast in the last month of the year preceding the spin-off
announcement as the predicted earnings. The forecast error is defined as the ratio of the
absolute difference between the predicted earnings and the actual earnings per share to
the stock price in the middle of the forecast month. Firms with more information
asymmetry are expected to have higher forecast errors. The second measure of
asymmetric information is the normalized standard deviation of forecasts. This is
measured as the standard deviation of all earnings forecasts made in the last month of the
fiscal year preceding the spin-off announcement year. The idea behind this variable is
that disagreement between analysts is an indication of information asymmetry. We
normalize the standard deviation by dividing it by the stock price of the firm in the
middle of the month in which the standard deviation of forecasts is measured. The third
measure is the number of analyst estimates. A higher number of available analyst
forecasts can be associated with better information about the firm, and consequently,
lower information asymmetry. The first measure was also used by Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999). The second variable is almost the same as a variable used by these
authors. They use the standard deviation of forecasts. We choose to normalize this
standard deviation in order to produce a measure that is independent of the absolute level
of the earnings per share.
                                                          
12 Ideally we would also like to use data on the number of segments and on the segment sales. However, the
data for these variables are not available in Compustat for European companies. This is probably caused by
the fact that in most European countries there is no legal obligation to report data on segment sales.13
Antidirector rights. Antidirector rights are measured using the index put forward
by La Porta et al. (1998). The index ranges from zero (very low shareholder protection)
to seven (very high shareholder protection).
Relative size. Relative size is measured as the market value of equity of the
divested subsidiary relative to the sum of the equity capitalizations of the parent and the
subsidiary. This is computed on the day of the completion of the spin-off (see also
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999)). This measure can be calculated only for the
sub-sample of completed spin-offs, while the other variables can be applied to the whole
sample of spin-off announcements (including still pending and canceled transactions).
3.3. Methodology
Event-study methodology
The announcement effects of the spin-offs are measured using an event study
methodology as described in, e.g., Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Hite and Owers
(1983). Daily abnormal returns are measured using the market model:
M
t i i t i t i R R AR , 1 , 0 , , α α − − = ,
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for firm i at day t, Ri,t denotes the return on security i at
day t, defined as ln(Pi,t) – ln(Pi,t-1), and Rt
M is the return on the market index, that is
measured in a similar way as Ri,t. The market index chosen is the Datastream total return
index for the individual European countries. The parameters  0 α and  1 α are estimated over
the estimation period by running an ordinary least squares regression of the stock returns
on a constant and the return of the market index. Denoting the announcement date,
reported by SDC, as day 0, this estimation period ranges from day –220 to day –21. The
event window ranges from day –1 to day +1.













where N is the sample size.
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The statistical significance of the average and cumulative average abnormal returns is
based on the average of standardized abnormal returns SARi,t, calculated for each
company.















































i is the residual variance from the company i market model estimation, and AR
M
is the mean market return during the estimation period.













This test statistic is asymptotically unit normally distributed under the assumption that the
average abnormal return is zero.
Consequently, the test statistic for the cumulative average abnormal returns over the 3-
day event window can be calculated as
3 *
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This statistic has a unit normal distribution under the hypothesis that the cumulative
average abnormal return over the event period is zero (assuming that returns are
independent).
Methodology for the calculation of the long-run excess returns
The long-term excess returns for both parent and subsidiary companies are calculated in
two different ways. First we simply compare the annualized buy-and-hold returns on a
stock to the corresponding market index for the same period. If the sample firm
disappears it is assumed that the proceeds are invested in the market index from that point
on. Barber and Lyon (1997) criticize the use of this technique. It may e.g. be the case that
the companies involved in the analysis have higher book-to-market ratios than the
average company in the market. This would lead to a distortion of the long-run excess
returns. Therefore, we also use a second approach that is similar to the one suggested by
Barber and Lyon (1997). Within this matching firm approach we look in each country for
a matching firm based on the size of a company and on its market-to-book ratio. More
specifically, in the first month after the spin-off for which we have data in Compustat we
divide all the companies in a certain market (country) into deciles based on the size of the
company. Size is defined as the market value of equity. In the decile that includes the
sample firm we look for the five companies that are closest to our sample firm in terms of
the market-to-book ratio. The closest matching firm is designated as the first matching
firm, the second closest matching firm is designated as the second matching firm and so16
on to the fifth matching firm. The stock return on the sample firm is then compared to the
return on the matching firm. If the first matching firm disappears for whatever reason, we
use the second matching firm from there on. If this firm also disappears we continue with
the third matching firm and so on. If the sample firm disappears it is assumed that the
proceeds are invested in its matching firm from that moment on.






where AERT denotes average excess return for this period and SET is the cross-sectional
standard error of the excess returns. In addition, we use the Wilcoxon signed ranks test
for the median long-run excess returns.
The long-run returns on the combined firm reflect the total impact of a spin-off on the
wealth of an investor holding the stock of the parent company prior to the reorganization.
These returns are calculated as a weighted average of excess returns on the parent and
subsidiary stock, where the relative market values of equity on the spin-off date (or on the
first date after the spin-off that they are available) are used as weights.
4.  Results
4.1. Announcement date results
The event study results are included in Table 2.
[Please put Table 2 here]
The results for all countries show a cumulative average abnormal return of 2.35% for the
event window from day –1 to day +1. This abnormal return is significant at the 1%-level.
The abnormal returns for smaller event windows, i.e. day 0 and day –1 to day 0, are also
significantly positive at the 1%-level. These results are confirmed in the non-parametric
sign test that tests for the number of positive observations. The results for Europe are in
line with the American studies that were discussed in the introduction.
Separate results are presented for countries for which we have more than 10 observations.
The cumulative average abnormal return for the United Kingdom is 2.56% for the event17
window from day –1 to day +1. This return is also significant at the 1%-level. Similar
results are found for the windows from day –1 to day 0 and for day 0.  Our results for the
event window day –1 to day 0 are in line with Murray (2000). However, he found an
insignificant cumulative average abnormal return for the event window day –1 to day +1,
where we find a strongly significant cumulative average abnormal return.
For Italy we find a significantly positive cumulative average abnormal return of 4.83%
for the event window from day –1 to day +1. The result for Sweden is lower, 0.82% and
is not significantly different from zero
13. In the case of Germany we find a significantly
positively cumulative average abnormal return of 3.23% for the day –1 to day +1 event
window. This might indicate that German investors are not very afraid of being taxed in a
later stage. They might have agreed with major shareholders of the company that they
would hold on to their shares for the 5-year period mentioned in the fiscal law.
Not all spin-offs that were announced in our sample period were also completed. In some
cases the spin-off was withdrawn. In other cases the spin-off was still pending. We have
also calculated mean cumulative abnormal returns for the sub-sample of 93 completed
spin-offs and for the sub-sample of 68 pending and withdrawn spin-offs. The means of
the two sub-samples are respectively 2.19% and 2.58%. Both means are significantly
different from zero on the 1%-significance level
14.
In Table 3 the event study results are compared for different sub-samples.
[Please put Table 3 here]
In Panel A the event study results are compared for companies that increase industrial
focus and for firms that do not increase industrial focus. In total 110 companies increase
their industrial focus by carrying out a spin-off. The mean abnormal return for these
companies is 2.89%. The mean for the 51 companies in the no-industrial focus sub-
sample is only 1.20%. The difference between the two samples is 1.69% with a t-statistic
of 1.37. This is similar to the earlier reported results for the United States by e.g. Daley et
al. (1997), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), and Desai and Jain (1999) who find
                                                          
13 The results for Sweden are partly driven by some announcements of Swedish banks that spun off big
property divisions that they were forced to acquire during the loan crisis of the early 1990s. These
announcements were generally associated with negative abnormal returns.
14 Detailed results for the two sub-samples are available on request from the authors.18
that the abnormal returns are larger for the focus-increasing spin-offs than for the non-
focus increasing spin-offs.
In Panel B the results are compared for companies that spun off a foreign division and for
companies that spun off a domestic division. Our hypothesis is that companies that spun
off a foreign division will be associated with higher abnormal returns than companies that
spun off a domestic division. The reason for this is that the spin-off of a foreign division
will lead to an increase in geographical focus. The mean cumulative average abnormal
return for the companies that spun off a foreign division is 2.63%. The mean for the
companies that spun off a domestic division is 2.32%. The difference is a positive 0.31%.
However, this difference is not statistically significant.
We also analyze the effects of asymmetric information. The number of observations for
these variables varies from 135 for the normalized standard deviation to 143 for the
number of analysts estimates. Although not presented in this paper, we have also
calculated the correlations between the measures of information asymmetry
15. The
forecast error and the normalized standard deviation of forecasts are positively and
significantly (at the 1%-level) correlated. This confirms our expectations, since both
measures are hypothesized to be positively related to the level of information asymmetry.
The third variable, number of analysts' forecasts, is significantly negatively correlated
with the other two variables for information asymmetry. These results are also expected,
since a firm that is followed by more analysts is supposed to have less information
asymmetry between managers and stockholders.
In Table 4 the regression results are presented for the cumulative average abnormal
returns over the three-day interval.
[Please put Table 4 here]
The first regression in Table 4 shows that industrial focus has a positive coefficient. This
coefficient only has a t-value of 1.647 and is therefore not significantly different from
zero. The second regression shows that geographical focus has a positive, but
insignificant, coefficient. These two regression coefficients confirm the results in Table 3.
In the third regression we include both industrial and geographical focus. This regression
shows that the coefficient for industrial focus is significantly different from zero at the
                                                          
15 The results are on request available from the authors.19
10%-level. In regressions (4) to (6) we include both industrial and geographical focus as
well as a different measure for information asymmetry in each regression. We find that
none of the coefficients are significantly different from zero. With regard to the
asymmetric information variables, only the number of analyst estimates shows the
expected sign. The other two variables, forecast error and normalized standard deviation
of forecasts, show signs that are opposite to their hypothesized signs. All the coefficients
have extremely small t-statistics. Therefore we conclude that, contrary to Krishnaswami
and Subramaniam (1999), we do not find any relationship between the announcement
return and the level of asymmetric information. In regressions (7) to (10) a measure for
anti-director rights is added. In all these regressions the antidirector rights variable does
not show the expected positive sign, but rather shows a negative sign. However, the
coefficient is not significant in any of the regressions. This can be explained by the fact
that spin-offs are considered to be value creating in countries with different levels of
shareholder protection.
In Table 5 we separately analyze the abnormal returns for completed spin-offs.
[Please put Table 5 here]
In Table 5 we add a control variable that measures the size of the spun-off subsidiary
relative to the size of the parent company. This variable is referred to as the relative size.
Unfortunately this variable is only available for a limited number of companies (55). The
number of observations is limited because this variable is, of course, only available for
completed spin-offs. Besides that, this variable is only available if Datastream reports
both the market value of equity of the parent and the market value of equity of the
subsidiary. We repeat the regressions of Table 4. The coefficient for relative size is
significantly different from zero in all regressions. This confirms earlier US results from
e.g. Hite and Owers (1983), and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983).  In the regressions in Table
5, the significance of industrial focus disappears. All regressions now show that
geographical focus is positively and significantly different from zero. Adding size to the
regression equations strongly increases the R
2. In the regressions in Table 4, the R
2 varies
from 0.0% to 1.4%. In the regressions in panel B the R
2 varies from 17.5% to 33.7%.
4.2. Long-run excess returns20
In Table 6 the annualized long-run excess returns of the parent companies, the
subsidiaries and the pro-forma combined firms in the period after the spin-off are
included.
[Please put Table 6 here]
In Table 6, the excess return is defined as the annualized company return minus the
market return. In Panel A the results for the parent companies are presented. In the
periods of 6 months and 12 months after the spin-off date, the mean annualized returns
are respectively an insignificant –3.39% and a significant –10.35%. The median returns
are significantly negative in both cases, i.e. –15.09% and –15.56%. After two years the
mean annualized return is –1.51% with a median of –1.78%. Both are insignificant. The
mean 3-year annualized excess return is an insignificant –4.69%. The median annualized
3-year return is significantly negative (-8.31%). We separately present the returns for the
sub-samples of focus-increasing and non-focus increasing parents. Overall both pictures
are negative. The mean and median returns for the industrial focus increasing firms are
significantly negative after 1 year. This improves after 2 years to very small positive and
insignificant abnormal returns. After 3 years the mean and median excess returns are
negative again, but not significantly. The non-industrial focus increasing firms show
insignificant mean excess returns up to and including 2 years after the spin-off date. The
annualized excess return is significantly negative (-11.95%) 3 years after the spin-off
date. The annual median excess returns are significantly negative at 1, 2 and 3 years after
the spin-off date. Our results differ from previous results that were published for the
United States. For example Cusatis et al. (1993), and Desai and Jain (1999) find that
parents of spin-offs perform significantly better than similar firms in the 3-year period
after the spin-off date. Desai and Jain (1999) find that this superior performance is caused
by the companies that improve their industrial focus. In Panel B we present the results for
the subsidiaries. The whole sample only shows insignificant mean and median excess
returns. The sub-samples of focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing subsidiaries also
mostly show insignificant long-run excess returns. These results also contradict earlier
results for the United States. For example, Desai and Jain (1999) find significantly
positive excess returns for their whole sample of subsidiaries. They find stronger results21
for their sub-sample of subsidiaries of focus-increasing parents. In case of subsidiaries of
non-focus increasing parents, they find insignificant excess returns.
A spin-off involves a pro-rata distribution of shares of the subsidiary. This enables us to
create a pro-forma combined firm in the period following the spin-off. Following Desai
and Jain (1999) we create this “firm” by weighting the return of the parent and that of the
subsidiary by the market value of equity at the spin-off date
16. This gives us the return
that an investor would have earned if he had held on to the shares of both the parent and
the subsidiary after the spin-off. In panel C of Table 6 we see that the pro-forma
combined firms are associated with significantly negative mean and median abnormal
returns in the 1-year period following the spin-offs. In the 2-year and 3-year periods
following the spin-offs the returns are still negative, but no longer significant
17.
The results in Table 6 may be biased because the company return is simply compared to
the market return. More precise results can be acquired if the company return is
compared to the return of a similar firm. In Table 7 we present results for a comparison of
the company returns to the returns of a matching portfolio. This matching procedure is
described in section 3.3.
[Please put Table 7 here]
In Panel A the results for the parent companies are presented. The means and the medians
for the whole sample are now mostly positive, but not significant. An analysis of the
difference between these results and the results in Table 6 shows that the difference is
caused by the fact that a large part of the parent companies are in the highest size decile
18.
Therefore the long-run returns of the parent companies are smaller than the long-run
market returns
19.  The results for the non-focus increasing companies seem to be better
than those of the industrial focus increasing companies for the period of 6-month to 1-
year after the spin-off. For the 2-year and 3-year periods after the spin-off the opposite
result seems to apply. We have also tested for the differences between the sub-samples of
focus-increasing and non-focus increasing companies, but we do not find significant
                                                          
16 Desai and Jain (1999) use the market value of equity at the end of the month of the spin-off.
17 Given the relatively small amount of observations we do not present results for sub-samples of focus-
increasing and non-focus increasing companies.
18 Results are available from the authors on request.
19 This is simply caused by the size effect, which leads to larger returns for small companies. See e.g. Fama
and French (1996).22
differences between the samples
20. In panel B we see that the subsidiaries have positive
long-run excess returns for the whole sample. However, the excess returns are only
significant for the period of 3 years after the spin-offs. The industrial focus-increasing
sub-sample also shows significant 3-year excess returns after the spin-off. The non-
industrial focus-increasing sub-sample shows insignificantly positive excess returns in
the 6-month to 3-year periods following the spin-offs. We also tested for differences
between the sub-samples of focus-increasing and non-focus increasing subsidiaries. We
only find a significant difference for both the means and the medians in the 6-month
period after the spin-off. In this period the non-focus-increasing subsidiaries outperform
the focus-increasing subsidiaries. In panel C we see that the pro-forma combined firms
only show insignificant long-run excess returns
21.
A close study of Table 7 reveals that there is definitely no significant long-run effect for
spin-offs. Although, the number of observations in panel A is fairly high (between 41 and
66), all t-statistics are very small (between –0.05 and 1.24). The same applies to the
Wilcoxon test for significance of differences in medians and to the test on the percentage
of positive observations. Finally, for the pro-forma combined firms (panel C) we also
find both small t-statistics and small Wilcoxon statistics. In other words, if we use the
correct procedure, i.e. the matching firm approach, controlling for the size and the book-
to-market effects, we find that there is no long-run effect after a spin-off. This confirms
the idea of Fama (1998) that the long-run effects following U.S. spin-offs are rather a
result of chance than of causality. It also confirms the notion that the European capital
market is efficient.
Finally, we study whether the long-run excess returns are related to any of the variables
discussed before. In Table 8 the relation between the long-run excess returns of the parent
firms and their underlying variables is studied.
[Please insert Table 8 here]
We focus on the 1-year and the 2-year excess returns. The reason for this is that we want
to study a relatively long period after the completion of the spin-off. Therefore we leave
out the 6-month excess returns. As we only have a limited number of observations for the
                                                          
20 These results are not reported, but are available on request.
21 Given the relatively small amount of observations, we do not present separate results for sub-samples of
focus-increasing and non-focus increasing firms.23
3-year period, we also leave out these results. In regressions (1) to (3) we present the
results for the 1-year excess returns; regressions (4) to (6) show the results for the 2-year
horizon. Not surprisingly, given the insignificant results for the long-run excess returns,
we find that most variables are insignificant. Both the industrial focus and the
geographical focus variables are insignificant in all regressions and have very low t-
statistics. The insignificance of the industrial focus variable contradicts the result of
Desai and Jain (1999) who find that US firms that increase their industrial focus with a
spin-off exhibit higher long run excess returns than firms that do not increase their
industrial focus. The coefficient for the relative size of spin-off is significantly positive,
indicating that the performance of the parent is better on the long run if a relatively large
part of the assets of the firm is spun off.
The pre-spin-off level of information asymmetry shows mixed impact on the long-term
performance. From regressions (1) to (3) it appears that lower levels of information
asymmetry are associated with higher excess returns for the one-year horizon. In
particular, the coefficients for the normalized standard deviation of analyst forecasts and
for the number of analyst forecasts are significant at the 5-percent level; the coefficient
for the forecast error is negative as well, although it is not statistically significant.
However, for the 2-year excess returns none of these three measures of information
asymmetry has a significant effect on excess returns. Overall, we do not find any support
for the hypothesis that firms with higher information asymmetry before the spin-off
display better long-run performance.
We also test the model of Habib et al. (1997) by measuring the impact of the changes in
the information asymmetry on the long-run performance of spin-off parents. We find that
a decrease in information asymmetry is positively related to the long-run excess returns
in three regressions out of six: for changes in the number of analyst estimates for both
time horizons, and for changes in the forecast error for the 1-year horizon. In two
regressions the coefficients for changes in information asymmetry are not statistically
significant, and in one it has the opposite effect
22. Thus, we find some confirmation of the
                                                          
22 An increase in the forecast error leads to higher 2-year excess returns. However, this result is caused by
only one outlier for which the very large change in the forecast error is based on only one analyst forecast.
After excluding this outlier this coefficient becomes insignificantly negative.24
model of Habib et al. (1997) by showing that a decrease in information asymmetry
following a spin-off can result in long-run overperformance.
The coefficient for the anti-director rights shows a negative sign in all regressions.
Moreover, in five out of six regressions this coefficient is statistically significant. This is
remarkable since it means that a higher level of shareholder protection is associated with
lower long-run excess returns. It is unlikely that this finding can be explained by the more
or less shareholder-friendly treatment of spin-offs in different countries, since we saw in
Tables 4 and 5 that the announcement returns were very similar in countries with
different shareholder protection. This result can possibly be explained by the fact that
firms that undertake spin-offs also continue to maintain their shareholder-oriented policy
in the long run. Our methodology controls for the financial characteristics of the
matching firms in the sense that we look for firms with similar size and book-to-market
value. However, it is possible that in countries with less shareholder protection, the
“average firm” that is used as a match is more likely to undertake actions that benefit
other stakeholders rather than the shareholders, while the firms that perform spin-offs are
more focussed on shareholder value maximization. It is possible that this creates a long-
run difference in the stock price performance between the sample and the matching firms.
On the other hand, in countries with a good shareholder protection, such as the United
Kingdom, other firms are more forced to act in the interests of shareholders than in a
country like Belgium. This may explain the negative sign for the anti-director rights
variable in Table 8.
5.  Summary and conclusions.
We study the efficiency of the European capital market for the case of corporate spin-
offs. According to the efficient market hypothesis, announcements of spin-offs may be
associated with positive abnormal returns. This is the case if the spin-off is associated
with a wealth increase for the shareholders. Such a wealth increase can be accomplished
if the spin-off leads to an increase in industrial or geographical focus or if the spin-off
leads to a decrease of the information asymmetry between the management of the firm
and its shareholders. The efficient market hypothesis also implies that there is no long-25
run effect. Possible wealth effects will be incorporated in the stock price at the moment
that the spin-off is announced.
We study announcement effects and long-run performance for a sample of 161 European
spin-offs announced from January 1987 to September 2000. We find that the
announcement of a spin-off is associated with a positive abnormal return of 2.35% over a
three-day window. We find some evidence that the abnormal returns are related to an
increase in either industrial or geographical focus. There does not seem to be a
relationship between the abnormal returns and the level of information asymmetry at the
time of the spin-off. In line with the efficient market hypothesis we do not find any
significant long-run excess return in the period after the spin-off. If the return on the
parents, subsidiaries and the pro-forma combined firms is compared to the return on a
matching portfolio, we find that the excess returns are both economically and statistically
insignificant. Therefore we conclude that spin-offs really create value on the short run,
but not on the long run.26
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Table 1: Observations by announcement year
Distribution of European companies that announced a spin-off in the period from January 1987 to September 2000 by announcement
year and country of the parent company. The spin-off announcements are identified from the Securities Data Company (SDC)
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Spin-offs are eliminated for the following reasons: (1)  double records of companies that
announce the spin-off of two or more subsidiaries on the same dates, (2) spin-offs by multiple parents and (3) spin-offs for which no
Datastream price data are available. Countries are denoted as follows: UK for United Kingdom, GER for Germany, FRA for France,
ITA for Italy, SWE for Sweden, NOR for Norway, DEN for Denmark, FIN for Finland, NL for the Netherlands, B for Belgium, CH
for Switzerland, SP for Spain, AUS for Austria, IRE for Ireland and GRE for Greece.
Year UK GER FRA ITA SWE NOR DEN FIN NL B CH SP AUS IRE GRE Total
1987 21 3
1988 22 1 5
1989 71 1 9
1990 61 1 8
1991 61 15 2 1 5
1992 21 21 1 7
1993 41 1 2 8
1994 31 11 17
1995 11 1 1 1 1 1 16
1996 10 3 1 9 1 2 26
1997 11 1 1 3 1 17
1998 13 5 1 7 2 3 31
1999 1 0 4 54321 13 1 3 4
2000 1 5 5 1 4 2 241 3 3 24 4 6
Total number






1 6 40267123032101 4 8
-/- multiple
parents   7    7
Total sample 7 1 1 4 51 2 2 4 1 0 1342622321 6 129
Table 2: Abnormal returns on the announcement date
Cumulative average abnormal returns for the sample of 161 spin-off announcements by European companies from January 1987 to
September 2000. The spin-off announcements are identified from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions
Database. Abnormal returns are based on the market model, estimated over a 200 day-period for each company (from day -220 to day
-21). The significance of the medians is tested by  means of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The sign test is used to test the significance
of the percentage of firms with positive abnormal returns. The null-hypothesis for the sign test is that the proportion of positive
cumulative average abnormal returns is equal to 50 percent. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (
*), 5% (
**) and 1% (
***) level.
Cumulative average abnormal returns
Interval Mean % z-statistic Median Percentage positive
All Europe (N = 161)
-10 to –1 0.58 3.22
*** 0.33 52.17












+1 to +10 -0.63 -0.82 -0.08 48.45
Including:
UK (N = 71)
-10 to –1 1.02 2.52
** 0.61 59.15












+1 to +10 -1.92 -1.26 -0.37 45.07
Sweden (N = 24)
-10 to –1 1.12 1.96
** 1.64 54.17
-1 to 0 0.66 1.17 -0.00 50.00
0 0.57 0.88 0.04 58.33
-1 to +1 0.82 0.87 0.11 58.33
+1 to +10 2.24 0.22 -0.38 41.6730
Table 2: Continued.
Cumulative average abnormal returns
Interval Mean % z-statistic Median Percentage positive
Germany (N = 14)
-10 to –1 3.88 1.81
* 1.98 57.14
-1 to 0 2.53 2.91
*** 0.65 57.14
0 1.10 1.63 0.14 57.14
-1 to +1 3.23 2.43
** 0.67 57.14
+1 to +10 2.15 0.94 2.37 71.43
Italy (N = 12)
-10 to –1 -0.98 -0.35 -2.16 41.67




-1 to +1 4.83 6.26
*** 3.18
* 75.00
+1 to +10 0.48 0.75 0.22 50.0031
Table 3: Announcement period abnormal returns by sub-sample
Three-day cumulative average abnormal returns for sub-samples of  161 announcements of spin-offs by European companies from
January 1987 to September 2000. The spin-off announcements are identified from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and
Acquisitions Database. Abnormal returns are based on the market model, estimated over a 200 day-period for each company (from
day -220 to day -21). Industrial focus-increasing spin-offs are defined as spin-offs of subsidiaries that have a two-digit SIC-code that
is different from the parent company. Geographical focus-increasing spin-offs are defined as spin-offs of subsidiaries from a different
country than the parent firm. The significance of the means is tested using a t-statistic. The significance of the medians is tested by
means of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The difference in means is tested using a t-statistic. The difference in medians is tested using
the Mann-Whitney statistic. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (
*), 5% (
**) and 1% (
***) level.
Panel A: Cumulative average abnormal returns (-1, +1) for sub-samples based on industrial focus
Industrial focus No industrial focus Difference
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median




* 1.64 (1.37) (1.46)
Panel B: Cumulative average abnormal returns (-1, +1) for sub-samples based on geographical focus
Geographical focus No geographical focus Difference
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median






Table 4: Regression of abnormal returns on focus and information asymmetry variables.
Regression coefficients for the three-day cumulative average abnormal returns for the announcements of 161 spin-offs by European
companies from January 1987 to September 2000. The spin-off announcements are identified from the Securities Data Company
(SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Industrial focus is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the first two digits of the primary SIC
code of a subsidiary to be spun-off are different from the first two digits of the primary SIC code of the parent company, and 0
otherwise. Geographical focus is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the case of a spin-off of a foreign subsidiary, and equal to 0 if the
spin-off is domestic. The forecast error is defined as the absolute difference between the mean analyst yearly earnings forecast in the
last month of the fiscal year preceding the spin-off announcement and the actual earnings, divided by the stock price. The normalized
standard deviation of forecasts is measured as the standard deviation of the analyst earnings forecasts in the last months of the fiscal
year preceding the spin-off announcement, divided by the stock price. The number of analyst estimates is the number of earnings
forecasts reported by IBES International in the last month of the fiscal year preceding the spin-off announcement. The “antidirector
rights” index is a summary measure of shareholder protection. This index ranges from zero to seven. The source of these data is La
Porta et al. (1998). Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (
*), 5% (
**) and 1% (
***) level, based on White heteroscedasticity-
adjusted standard errors. t-statistics are in parentheses.





















































































Number of observations 161 161 161 138 135 143 161 138 135 143
R
2 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.014 0.014
Adjusted R
2 0.005 -0.006 -0.000 -0.016 -0.015 -0.012 -0.006 -0.023 -0.016 -0.01533
Table 5: Regression of abnormal returns for completed spin-offs.
Regression coefficients for the three-day cumulative average abnormal returns for the completed announcements of 55 spin-offs by
European companies from January 1987 to September 2000. Includes the results for only those completed spin-offs for which the
relative size of the spin-off is known. The spin-off announcements are identified from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers
and Acquisitions Database. Industrial focus is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the first two digits of the primary SIC code of a
subsidiary to be spun-off are different from the first two digits of the primary SIC code of the parent company, and 0 otherwise.
Geographical focus is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the case of a spin-off of a foreign subsidiary, and equal to 0 if the spin-off is
domestic. The forecast error is defined as the absolute difference between the mean analyst yearly earnings forecast in the last month
of the fiscal year preceding the spin-off announcement and the actual earnings, divided by the stock price. The normalized standard
deviation of forecasts is measured as the standard deviation of the analyst earnings forecasts in the last months of the fiscal year
preceding the spin-off announcement, divided by the stock price. The number of analyst estimates is the number of earnings forecasts
reported by IBES International in the last month of the fiscal year preceding the spin-off announcement. The “antidirector rights”
index is a summary measure of shareholder protection. This index ranges from zero to seven. The source of these data is La Porta et
al. (1998). The relative size is equal to the ratio of the market value of the spun-off subsidiary equity to the sum of the market values




***) level, based on White heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. t-statistics are in parentheses.





























































































































Number of observations 55 55 55 50 49 51 55 50 49 51
R
2 0.212 0.235 0.239 0.175 0.258 0.261 0.272 0.181 0.337 0.332
Adjusted R
2 0.182 0.205 0.194 0.102 0.190 0.197 0.213 0.088 0.259 0.25834
Table 6: Long-run returns in excess of the market return
Annualized returns defined as the company return minus the corresponding market return for spin-offs by European companies from
January 1987 to September 2000. The spin-offs are identified from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions
Database. The pro-forma combined firm is created by weighting the return of the parent and that of the subsidiary by the market value
of equity at the spin-off date. Industrial focus-increasing spin-offs are defined as spin-offs of subsidiaries that have a two-digit SIC-
code that is different from the parent company. Geographical focus-increasing spin-offs are defined as spin-offs of subsidiaries from a
different country as the parent firm. The significance of the means is tested using a t-statistic. The significance of the medians is tested
by means of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The sign test is used to test the significance of the percentage of firms with positive excess
returns. The null-hypothesis for the sign test is that the proportion of positive cumulative average excess returns is equal to 50 percent.
tsp is the spin-off date. tsp + 6 (12, 24, 36) is the period from the spin-off date to 6 (12, 24, 36) months after the spin-off date. Asterisks
indicate significance at the 10% (
*), 5% (
**) and 1% (
***) level.
Panel A: All parent firms
Number of
observations




tsp to tsp + 6 89 -3.39 -0.24 -15.09
** 2.28 38.20
**




tsp to tsp + 24 73 -1.51 -0.29 -1.78 1.43 43.84




tsp to tsp + 6 65 -15.67 -1.49 -15.09
* 1.95 40.00




tsp to tsp + 24 51 2.26 0.35 2.01 0.18 54.90
tsp to tsp + 36 38 -0.68 -0.16 -3.10 0.71 44.74
Non-industrial focus-increasing parents
tsp to tsp + 6 24 29.86 0.70 -15.47 1.27 33.33
tsp to tsp + 12 24 -2.89 -0.19 -17.15
* 1.84 25.00
**
tsp to tsp + 24 22 -10.25 -1.36 -18.13
** 2.01 18.18
***





Panel B: All subsidiaries
Number of
observations




tsp to tsp + 6 68 15.19 1.13 -6.28 0.54 44.12
tsp to tsp + 12 68 -0.39 -0.06 -9.83 1.08 41.18
tsp to tsp + 24 55 2.34 0.41 -2.55 0.50 47.27
tsp to tsp + 36 46 0.24 0.06 -0.97 0.42 47.83
Industrial focus-increasing subsidiaries
tsp to tsp + 6 52 4.75 0.39 -11.42 1.13 40.38
tsp to tsp + 12 52 -6.54 -1.04 -14.53
* 1.77 32.69
**
tsp to tsp + 24 40 -2.66 -0.46 -2.06 0.89 47.50
tsp to tsp + 36 32 -1.78 -0.51 0.81 0.61 50.00
Non-industrial focus-increasing subsidiaries
tsp to tsp + 6 16 49.09 1.21 14.32 0.96 56.25
tsp to tsp + 12 16 19.59 1.28 11.66 1.16 68.75
tsp to tsp + 24 15 15.67 1.14 -2.55 0.31 46.67
tsp to tsp + 36 14 4.84 0.46 -5.43 0.19 42.86
Panel C: All pro-forma combined firms
tsp to tsp + 6 55 -7.23 -1.13 -8.15
* 1.82 38.18




tsp to tsp + 24 44 -0.36 -0.07 -1.87 0.68 45.45
tsp to tsp + 36 38 -1.03 -0.29 -1.63 0.52 44.7436
Table 7: Long-run returns in excess of the matching portfolio return
Annualized returns defined as company return minus matching firm return for spin-offs by European companies from January 1987 to
September 2000. The spin-offs are identified from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The pro-
forma combined firm is created by weighting the return of the parent and that of the subsidiary by the market value of equity at the
spin-off date. Industrial focus-increasing spin-offs are defined as spin-offs of subsidiaries that have a two-digit SIC-code that is
different from the parent company. Geographical focus-increasing spin-offs are defined as spin-offs of subsidiaries from a different
country as the parent firm. The significance of the means is tested using a t-statistic. The significance of the medians is tested by
means of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The sign test is used to test the significance of the percentage of firms with positive excess
returns. The null-hypothesis for the sign test is that the proportion of positive cumulative average excess returns is equal to 50 percent.
tsp is the spin-off date. tsp + 6 (12, 24, 36) is the period from the spin-off date to 6 (12, 24, 36) months after the spin-off date. Asterisks
indicate significance at the 10% (
*), 5% (
**) and 1% (
***) level.
Panel A: All parent firms
Number of
observations




tsp to tsp + 6 66 8.04 0.35 -0.56 0.56 48.48
tsp to tsp + 12 65 -0.35 -0.05 3.93 0.54 52.31
tsp to tsp + 24 53 9.75 1.24 3.19 1.07 60.38
tsp to tsp + 36 41 1.77 0.31 -0.20 0.14 48.78
Industrial focus-increasing parents
tsp to tsp + 6 50 -9.08 -0.45 0.42 0.83 50.00
tsp to tsp + 12 49 -4.71 -0.82 2.97 0.55 51.02
tsp to tsp + 24 39 13.72 1.46 10.08 1.51 66.67
*
tsp to tsp + 36 28 6.10 0.86 -2.37 0.38 46.43
Non-industrial focus increasing parents
tsp to tsp + 6 16 61.53 0.89 -16.34 0.08 43.75
tsp to tsp + 12 16 12.98 0.51 4.00 0.03 56.25
tsp to tsp + 24 14 -1.34 -0.09 -1.63 0.38 42.86
tsp to tsp + 36 13 -7.54 -0.78 1.32 0.49 53.8537
Table 7: Continued.
Panel B: All subsidiaries
Number of
observations




tsp to tsp + 6 45 10.03 0.49 -6.40 0.11 48.89
tsp to tsp + 12 45 9.98 1.00 0.30 0.54 51.11
tsp to tsp + 24 41 11.97 1.65 6.43
* 1.67 65.85
*





tsp to tsp + 6 31 -11.15 -0.58 -13.25 0.56 41.94
tsp to tsp + 12 31 5.62 0.45 -3.89 0.03 41.94
tsp to tsp + 24 28 9.74 1.11 6.13 1.38 67.86
*





tsp to tsp + 6 14 56.95 1.17 9.36 0.88 64.29
tsp to tsp + 12 14 19.64 1.19 9.12 1.38 71.43
tsp to tsp + 24 13 16.77 1.27 11.78 0.98 61.54
tsp to tsp + 36 13 14.56 1.38 15.66 0.98 61.54
Panel C: All pro-forma combined firms
tsp to tsp + 6 31 -5.04 -0.39 3.58 0.09 54.84
tsp to tsp + 12 31 -8.02 -1.17 1.63 0.89 51.61
tsp to tsp + 24 28 1.45 0.19 0.76 0.33 53.57
tsp to tsp + 36 25 2.24 0.47 -1.17 0.16 48.0038
Table 8: Regression of long-run excess return: Parent firms
Regression coefficients for the one- and two-year returns in excess of the matching portfolio return for the 44 European companies
that performed a spin-off. The spin-off dates are identified from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions
Database. Industrial focus is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the first two digits of the primary SIC code of a subsidiary to be spun-off
are different from the first two digits of the primary SIC code of the parent company, and 0 otherwise. Geographical focus is a dummy
variable equal to 1 in the case of a spin-off of a foreign subsidiary, and equal to 0 if the spin-off is domestic. The forecast error is
defined as the absolute difference between the mean analyst yearly earnings forecast in the last month of the fiscal year preceding the
spin-off announcement and the actual earnings, divided by the stock price. The normalized standard deviation of forecasts is measured
as the standard deviation of the analyst earnings forecasts in the last months of the fiscal year preceding the spin-off announcement,
divided by the stock price. The number of analyst estimates is the number of earnings forecasts reported by IBES International in the
last month of the fiscal year preceding the spin-off announcement. Changes in the last three variables are measured from the end of
fiscal year preceding the spin-off announcement to the end of the fiscal year in which the spin-off is completed. The “antidirector
rights” index is a summary measure of shareholder protection. This index ranges from zero to seven. The source of these data is La
Porta et al. (1998). The relative size is equal to the ratio of the market value of the spun-off subsidiary equity to the sum of the market




***) level, based on White heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. t-statistics are in parentheses.39
Table 8: Continued.
Variable One-year excess return Two-year excess return












































































































Number of observations 41 42 44 35 35 36
R
2 0.313 0.372 0.317 0.691 0.242 0.340
Adjusted R
2 0.192 0.264 0.206 0.625 0.080 0.20340
Appendix: The regulatory and fiscal environment for European spin-offs
Spin-offs are legally possible in all European countries. For members of the European union the 6th
EC-directive on corporation law is important
23. This directive, that defines the legal terms for split-
ups, stems from December 17, 1982. Member states were advised to incorporate it in their laws by
January 1, 1986
24. However, in some countries it took longer to incorporate this directive in the
national law. For example, in Belgium split-ups were not covered by corporate law until June 29,
1993 (Zaman, 1998). This does not mean that split-ups were illegal. They were permitted and they
were generally legally arranged using the framework that was set in the fiscal law. In Europe, the
legal frameworks for spin-offs are generally based on the laws for split-ups. However, in some
cases it took some time before a special framework for spin-offs was set up. For example, until
February 1998, Dutch companies that wanted to spin-off one or more divisions had to go through a
large range of complicated procedures. This ended on February 1, 1998 with the adoption of a law
in which matters were significantly simplified (see Van Olffen et al. 1998).
In principle, spin-offs may cause an income tax problem, because they can be seen as a distribution
of income or capital and be taxed accordingly. On July 23, 1990 the European Union adopted the
so-called “Merger Directive”. According to this directive, the capital gains taxation on a spin-off is
deferred. In other words, the tax authorities consider a spin-off as the re-arrangement of
investments that the investor already owns, and as a result, levy no taxes. This directive applies to
intra-community spin-offs. The ultimate intention for this directive is its application in all countries
within the European Union
25. According to Gibbs (1999), tax deferral does not cause major
problems in most European countries. Like in the United States, it is important that the spin-offs
are carried out for business reasons. In some countries, spin-offs are associated with potential fiscal
problems. This is the case for the Netherlands (until June 1998), Germany and France. Before June
1998, spin-offs in the Netherlands were seen as a distribution of income or capital and they were
taxed accordingly. Under the pressure of some large Dutch companies spin-offs were no longer
taxed from June 1998. Instead the fiscal claims were passed on to the future
26. This opened the way
for one of the largest European spin-offs in which the Dutch company KPN spinned off its postal
                                                          
23 The following countries are member states of the European union. From 1951: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. From 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. From 1981: Greece. From
1986: Spain and Portugal. From 1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden.
24 Note that countries are not obliged to incorporate the directive.
25 See Raedler (1994).
26 See Poetgens and Jakobsen (1999), and Van Olffen et al. (1998).41
division TNT Post Groep
27. Besides that, two other relatively large spin-offs could be realized. In
Germany spin-offs can be arranged in a tax-neutral way. However, if more than 20% of the
shareholders transfer their shares within 5 years after the spin-off, the spin-off will still be taxed
(Zaman, 1998). In France a problem occurs in the sense that it is not possible for the company to
ask for approval from the tax authorities before the transaction is carried out. This uncertainty is
probably the cause of the low number of spin-offs that were announced in France. In the period
from January 1987 to September 2000 a mere total of 7 spin-offs were announced in France.
                                                          
27 The market value of KPN and TNT Post Groep after the spin-off were respectively 17.9 billion US $ and 11.6 billion
US $, making it one of the largest spin-offs in Europe.